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USIB-M-712  
15 January 1976

2. Key Intelligence Questions  
Performance Evaluation  
Summary for Fiscal Year 1975  
(USIB/IRAC-D-22.1/47; USIB-M-711, 8 January 1976, Item d)

Mr. Colby said, as he had indicated last week, that the subject report should be considered a working paper, noting that the findings are only preliminary. Accordingly, he said he had requested that the formally printed version of the report be recalled. Mr. Colby commented that this is a step toward developing a system for performance review, but as in any management system, it would probably take three to five years to make it fully effective. In this connection he noted that the KIQ approach was in its second year of operation, while the KEP was being tried for the first time.

This report, he said, stresses statistical analysis, but not substantive review. Mr. Colby advised that he was asking the Intelligence Community Staff to produce a substantive evaluation using the assessments of the NIOs and the statistical analysis of the report as a point of departure. He again stressed that the report before the Board was a working paper. This notwithstanding, he said that it raised several interesting points. Mr. Colby used several charts from the report to assist him in elaboration of some of the major points.

Mr. Colby said that his review of the paper suggested steps which could be considered for the next cycle. There is no question, he said, that there is a real need to establish a system for relating expenditures to product, but whether the process should be continued in its present form remains to be determined.

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General Allen said that he fully agreed with Mr. Colby's views, noting that he had supported the entire KIQ process from the outset. General Allen believed, however, that even though the report before the Board had a negative value, a solution was almost within grasp. He suggested it might be more useful to examine each KIQ individually with equal attention to the KIQ strategy report. He said that he did not yet understand the statistical analysis and so far as he was concerned it remains to be developed to the point of being useful. General Allen observed that, while he agreed with Mr. Colby's point regarding the period of time required to develop a managerial system, we must also address whether the right statistical information is being produced to support decision making. He again stressed the value of the KIQs and the KIQ strategy reports as one of the more valuable efforts which had been made within the USIB structure in recent years.

Admiral Harvey said that DIA heartily endorsed General Allen's and Mr. Colby's views on this matter.

Mr. Colby indicated his concern about the time and difficulty involved in obtaining statistical data. In response, General Allen said that, with NSA's computers, this was not the problem for his agency, the real problem was to understand the data once it had been produced. Admiral Harvey said that it was much more difficult for DIA to develop data than it was for NSA, but that DIA supported the overall concept.

Mr. Colby asked if there were any suggestions on how to simplify the process. Admiral Harvey said that DIA may have suggestions based on its development of the Defense KIQs process. Mr. Carver suggested that if the USIB wished to support additional attention on this matter, the NIOs could select one or two KIQ strategies for in depth examination to see if the process could be made more meaningful. Mr. Carver said that this would require the NIOs to address the selected KIQs in a detailed and precise manner, including candid discussion of deficiencies and what must be done to answer the KIQs. He said the results of such

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an examination might be a call for an effort in excess of the budget; this then should drive a USIB discussion of the priorities of each requirement. Mr. Carver noted that such an effort would require full community cooperation. Mr. Colby observed, as noted by General Allen, that the KIQ strategy reports were very important, justifying a lot of effort to make them work.

Commenting on the large number of man hours involved, Admiral Harvey observed that the overall process in DIA for the FY-76 KIQs was further behind than was the case a year ago for FY-75. He suggested that the KIQ's may not need to be specifically keyed to fiscal years. Mr. Colby commented that, if the overall process can be made to work, it would not be so important to hold it to a fiscal year basis. Mr. Carver suggested formulating KIQs once and then annually reviewing and updating them.

Mr. Colby said he would look to the Intelligence Community Staff to examine this problem based on the points raised during the USIB discussion. The Intelligence Community Staff should provide the DCI and the USIB with the results of the review for consideration regarding how to proceed with the KIQ evaluation process.

3. Presentation of National Intelligence  
Distinguished Service Medal to  
Mr. W. E. Colby

The USIB was convened in special session at 1130 hours for the purpose of awarding Mr. Colby the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal.

General Wilson presented the award accompanied by the following citation:

"Mr. William E. Colby is hereby awarded the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal for distinguished and meritorious service and achievement on behalf of the United States

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